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RECENT CASES
Bankruptcy-Concealment of Assets Outside the Territorial
Jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court-Where bankruptcy proceed-
ings were held in Pennsylvania, and assets which had never been in Penn-
sylvania, were secreted in New Jersey, it was held that the defendant could
properly be tried in Pennsylvania for the offense of concealing assets,
although conviction was reversed on other grounds.' United States v.
Schierson, 116 Fed. (2d) 881 (C. C. A. 3d, 194o).
The Sixth Amendment requires a defendant to be tried in the "state
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed".2 Section 29-b
of the Bankruptcy Act makes it a criminal offense to conceal assets from
the trustee in bankruptcy. There is no offense until a trustee is appointed
from whom the assets may be concealed, 4 but a physical concealment prior
to bankruptcy which continues after bankruptcy will constitute the offense
without any further act by the bankrupt.5 The instant case overrules 3
Gretsch v. United States,7 which held that a bankrupt in a New Jersey
court could not be convicted there for the offense of concealing assets,
where the assets were secreted in New York, because the offense had
occurred outside of the territorial jurisdiction of the court. The instant
case, however, properly holds that the criminal "act" is the failure to dis-
close where there is a duty to do so," not the physical act of concealment,
which would not be a crime in itself were it not for the duty imposed by
the Act.9 Thus there can be no valid constitutional objection since the
crime is considered to have occurred at the place where the bankruptcy
proceedings are being conducted, as it is there that the information is with-
held." This view is dearly more desirable:" since it doses an avenue
which heretofore existed for fraud by the dishonest debtor.
i. There was a prejudicial charge by the trial judge to the effect that the jury
could convict on the basis of certain property which was shown to have been originally
concealed but which was not proved to have been still concealed at the time of bank-
ruptcy. Thus the conviction was reversed and a new trial ordered. . Instant case at 885.
The inference that the money remained concealed at the time of the bankruptcy could
not be drawn from the fact that it was originally secreted. Reiner v. United States, 92
Fed. (2d) 823 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937).
2. U. S. CONST. Amend. VI.
3. 44 STAT. 662, II U. S. C. A. § 52-b. The concealment may be of either legal or
equitable title, since the trustee succeeds to both legal and equitable title of the bank-
rupt, if that interest could have been transferred by the bankrupt, or if his creditors
could have attached it. Thummess v. Van Hoffman, iog Fed. (2d) 293 (C. C. A. 3d,
1940).
4. United States v. Yasser, 114 Fed. (2d) 558 (C. C. A. 3d, 194o).
5. Glass v. United States, 231 Fed. 65 (C. C. A. 3d, 1916); Johnson v. United
States, 163 Fed. 30 (C. C. A. Ist, 19o8) ; 2 CoLuIa, BANKRu cy (I4th ed. 194o) 1153.
6. "We believe that Gretsch v. United States, supra, should be and it is overruled."
Instant case at 884.
7. 231 Fed. 57 (C. C. A. 3d, 1916).
8. See 2 COLLIeR, op. cit. supra note 5, at 1151.
9. Ibid.
IO. "So, here, if the bankrupt falsified his schedule of assets in Philadelphia, he
'withheld knowledge of' them from the trustee and thereby concealed them no matter
where the goods were located." Instant case at 884.
ii. The view of the Gretsch case is disapproved in (1916) 16 CoL. L. Ray. 602,
and Levitt, Federal Bankruptcy Act: Twenty-nine (1926) I Cora. L. Q. 300, 307.
Compare (1916) 14 MIcH. L. REV. 673.
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RECENT CASES
Bankruptcy-Definition of Farmer Under Sections 1 (17) and
75 (r)-Debtor's farm, pledged to secure her husband's mercantile
debts, was cultivated by a sharecropper under an agreement by which the
latter furnished labor, stock and tools, and the debtor, the land and fer-
tilizer. Debtor exercised general supervision. Products of the farm were
sold in her name, and her share of the profits comprised her sole income.
On involuntary petition in bankruptcy' by her deceased husband's credi-
tors held, debtor was not exempt as a "farmer" 2 within Section I (7),
since she was not personally engaged in farming nor was the principal
part of her income derived from personal participation in any of the related
farming operations. In re Nicholson, 36 F. Supp. 308 (E. D. S. C. I94O).
An 82-year-old debtor continued operation of her 23o-acre farm under
active management of her son. Income from farm was used by son to pro-
vide necessities for debtor and to pay her personal expenses. Debtor mort-
gaged the farm to secure a loan for son and subsequently filed voluntary
petition under Section 75,4 which provides for agricultural compositions 5
for "farmers". On motion to dismiss by mortgagee, her sole creditor, held,
petition dismissed. Debtor was not a "farmer" within Section 75 (r), since
she was not personally engaged in farming or in any farming operation from
which she derived the principal part of her income. In re Joyce, 36 F.
Supp. 13 (W. D. La. 1941).
Among the ambiguities 6 in the Chandler Act 7 may be placed the con-
trasting 8 definitions of "farmer" to be found in Sections I (17) and 75 (r).
The latter provides two alternative tests 9 by which courts may determine
the status of the debtor seeking an agricultural composition or extension of
his debts, namely, personal participation in farming or in certain specified
related operations, or derivation of the principal part of his income 10 from
. "Any natural person, except a wage earner or farmer, . . . may be adjudged
an involuntary bankrupt. . ." Chandler Act § 4 (b), ii U. S. C. A. § 22 (b) (Supp.
794o). As to who may file involuntary petition in bankruptcy see Chandler Act
§ 59 (b), ii U. S. C. A. § 95 (b) (Supp. 1940).
2. 1 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY (14th ed. i94o). I4.i5.
3. Section I (17) defines "farmer" as an "individual personally engaged in farm-
ing or tillage of the soil and shall include" one "personally engaged in dairy farming
or in the production of poultry, livestock, or poultry or livestock products in theirunmanufactured state, if the principal part of his income is derived from one or more
of such operations." Chandler Act § I (17), 52 STAT. 840 (1938), I U. S. C. A.
§i (17) (Supp. 1940).
4. Section 75 (r) provides . . . "the term 'farmer' includes not only an indi-
vidual who is primarily bona fide personally engaged in producing products of the soil,
but also . . ." one "... personally engaged in . . ." related farming operations
same as in § 1 (17) "...or the principal part of whose income is derived from any
one or more of the aforegoing operations:' Chandler Act § 75 (r), 54 STAT. 40 (1940),
i i U. S. C. A. § 203 (r) (Supp. 1940). For a legislative history of both §§ 75 and
1 (17), see Note, What Section Governs Eligib.ility to, Farmers' Compositions? (1941)
26 CORN. L. Q. 308.
5. Section 75 (s) is better known as the Frazier-Lemke Act, enacted in 1935, but
recently extended until March 4, 1944. Section 75 (a-r), enacted in 1933, provides a pro-
cedure whereby farmers may arrange a composition with their creditors and, now if that
fails, be granted a three year period within which to pay their debts under § 75 (s).
Bankruptcy results if debtors fail to do so by the end of that period. Chandler Act§ 75, 11 U. S. C. A. § 203 (Supp. 1940) ; Diamond and Letzler, The New Frazier-
Lemke Act: A Study (938) Ai CoRP. REoao. AND Am. BANKR. REV. 123; Notes
(1941) 26 CORN. L. Q. 308, (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 859.
6. Mulder, Ambiguities in Chandler Act (194o) 84 U. OF PA. L. REv. 1.
7. 52 STAT. 840 (1838), 1I U. S. C. A. (Supp. 194o).
8. I COLLIER, op. cit. supra note 2; Diamond and Letzler, lc. cit. supra note 5, at
127, n. 33; Notes (I94i) 26 CORN. L. Q. 308, (I939) 18 ORE. L. Ry. i08, (0940) 12
ROCKY MT. L. REV. 197, 198.
9. First National Bank & Trust Co. v. Beach, 301 U. S. 435 (1937).
xo. The better view is that this means gross income, Matter of Knight, 9 F. Supp.
3o3 (D. C. Conn. 1934). Contra: Sherwood v. Kitcher, 86 F. (2d) 750 (C. C. A. 2d,
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either farming or the latter." On the other hand, Section I (17), which
governs exemption of "farmers" from involuntary adjudication under Sec-
tion 4 (b), states a more restrictive definition: an individual either per-
sonally engaged in farming, or personally engaged in any of the related
operations, if the principal part of his income is derived from such.12  Thus,
for example, prior to the Joyce case, a debtor could be a "farmer" under
Section 75 (r) even though he never resided on, nor personally managed
his farm, if his principal income came from its operation or-rental.13 But
under Section i (7) such a debtor would not be a farmer.14 This distinc-
tion has been supported by analogy to the definitions of a "wage earner"
under the Act, which provides that the latter, for purposes of exemption
from involuntary bankruptcy in Section 4 (b), is an individual who works
for salary or hire at a sum not exceeding $I5OO per year; 15 while, for pur-
poses of obtaining relief by a "wage earner's plan" under Chapter XIII, 16
he is one whose annual earnings do not exceed $36oo. Then, too, the pol-
icy 17 supporting both distinctions is identical, namely, to restrict exemp-
tions solely to persons whom bankruptcy would wipe out,' 8 and to enlarge
the class of debtors permitted rehabilitation by composition and extension
agreements.' Some doubt as to whether this distinction will continue has
been created by the recent amendment 20°to Section 75 (r) which provides
that the definition of farmer therein shall also govern Section 4 (b). The
amendment impliedly repeals Section I (17). However, considering the
past haphazard, political "football' treatment 21 of Section 75 by Congress
and a recent appellate22 decision that Section I (17) impliedly repealed
Section 75 (r), the argument 2 has been made that the amendment was
1936). For defense of gross income, see I COLLIER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 611, n.
37-40; but see Notes (1939) 18 ORE. L. REv. IO8, 113, (1935) 15 ORE. L. REv. 62, 65
(defense of net income).
ii. "The two are not equivalents. They were used by way of contrast. Occasions
must have been in view when the receipt of income derived from farming operations
would make a farmer out of someone who personally or primarily was engaged in dif-
ferent activities." From opinion by Judge Cardozo in First National Bank and Trust
Co. v. Beach, 301 U. S. 435, 438 (937). See also I COLLIER, op. cit. supra. note 2, at
609.
12. Explanatory note to § I (7) in Report of the House Committee on .Tuticiary,
July 29, 1937, page 6, as stated in C. C. H. Bankr. Serv., 14018 ('941).
13. In re Shonkwiler, 17 F. Supp. 697 (E. D. Ill. 1935) ; accord: First National
Bank & Trust Co. v. Beach, 301 U. S. 435 (1937) ; cf. Shyvers v. Security-First Na-
tional Bank, io8 F. (2d) 611 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939); In re Davis, 22 F. Supp. 12 (D.
Iowa 1938).
14. See Benitez v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 8O9 F. (2d) 743, 750 (C. C. A. Ist, 194o);
I CoLlm, op. cit. supra note 2, at 612.
15. Chandler Act § I (32), 11 U. S. C. A. § I (32) (Supp. 1940).
6. Chandler Act § 6o6 (8), I1 U. S. C. A. (Supp. 194o).
17. "Wage earners and farmers were obviously excluded from involuntary bank-
ruptcy because wage earners belong to a class habitually favored in legislation on ac-
count of their limited means; and farmers were excluded presumably because they do
not actively engage in trade, and because to deprive them of their farms would also
deprive them of their means of subsistence." Williston, The Effect of a National Bank-
ruptcy Law (1909) 22 HARv. L. REV. 547, 553.
18. Mulder, Wage Earners' Plans Under Chapter XIII (941) (No. 9 of a series
of lectures delivered before the Credit Men's Association of Eastern Pennsylvania).
19. Mulder, Debtor Relief for Fariners (1941) (No. io of series mentioned in note
18 supra).
2o. The new Section 75 (r) now reads: "For the purpose of this section and sec-
tion 4 (b) the term 'farmer' includes . . " See note 4 supra. What effect does this
amendment have on § I (17) ?
21. "Section 75 was a hastily concocted statute dragooned into the Act of March
3, 1933, as the price of the passage of the railroad bankruptcy section." Hanna, Agri-
culture and the Bankruptcy Act (934) 19 MINN. L. Rmv. I, 5.
22. Benitez v. Bank of Nova Scotia, iog F. (2d) 743 (C. C. A. ISt, 1940).
23. See Note (1941) 26 CORN. L. Q. 308.
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merely to emphasize Congressional intent that the eligibility of a debtor-
petitioner under Section 75 be determined by subdivision (r). Unfor-
tunately, both instant cases arose prior to this amendment, and presumably
for that reason it was ignored by both. Though the courts were concerned
with different sections, they in fact applied the restrictive definition of
"farmer" to be found in Section I (17), i. e., personal participation by the
debtor in operation of the farm.
Conceding arguendo the desirability of such a uniform test, the results
reached were manifestly unjust to both debtors. Under Section I (17) and
its predecessors 24 the combined existence of the three factors in the Nichol-
son case: (i) sole income derived from farming operations, (2) absence of
any other occupation, and (3) supervision over the sharecropper's activi-
ties would have placed the debtor within the exempted class.2 5 Neither the
non-farming character of the indebtedness 28 nor the sharecropper's owner-
ship of the tools 27 would have altered that status. Although in the Joyce
situation the third factor noted in the Nicholson case was absent, the alter-
native principal-source-of-income test would have supported her petition for
an agricultural composition.28 The physical incapacity 29 of the aged widow,
who depended for her livelihood on the products of her farm, should not
have altered her status as a "farmer", even though her son managed the
farming operations." The effect of the court's decision as to her was
unfortunate; she was forced into bankruptcy with the consequent loss of
her farm, since no relief other than Section 75 was available 31 to her.
Chapter XII,32 which provides for compositions for debtors who are bur-
dened by secured debts, would be ineffective since confirmation of any
composition depends upon debtor's obtaining the consent of his creditors.33
24. Section 4 (b) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 ori'ginally provided that "a per-
son engaged chiefly in farming or the tillage of the soil" was exempt from involuntary
adjudication. 30 STAT. 544, 11 U. S. C. A. § 22 (b) (I927). In 1935 the section was
amended by substituting the words "a farmer" for the italicized phrase and the defini-
tion of "farmer" in § 75 (r) governed: "any individual who is primarily bona fide per-
sonally engaged in producing products of the soil. . . " See note 4 supra. -
25. Evans v. Florida National Bank, 38 F. (2d) 627 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930); In re
Glick, 26 F. (2d) 398 (C. C. A. 7th, 1928) ; in re Brais, IS F. (2d) 693 (C. C. A. 7th,
1926) ; Powers v. Silberman, 3 F. (2d) 803 (C. C. A. 3d, 1925) ; In re Cox, 9 F. Supp.
244 (S. D. Ili. 1935).
26. Evans v. Florida National Bank, 38 F. (2d) 627 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930) ; Pow-
ers v. Silberman, 3 F. (2d) 803 (C. C. A. 3d, 1925) ; In re Folkstad (D. Mont. 1912).
Contra: In. re Macklem, 22 F. (2d) 426 (D. Mich. 1927).
27. Evans v. Florida National Bank, 38 F. (2d) 627 (C. C. A. 5th, 193o) ; In re
Glick, 26 F. (2d) 398 (C. C. A. 7th, z928).
28. Generally, factors which the courts have considered in varying degrees as con-
trolling have been: (i) Prhwipal source of iwnome, Benitez v. Bank of Nova Scotia,
io9 F. (2d) 743 (C. C. A. Ist, 1940); In re Moser, 95 F. (2d) 944 (C. C. A. 9th,
1938) ; Rudy v. Federal Land Bank of Baltimore, 91 F. (2d) 549 (C. C. A. 3d, 1937) ;
In re Peterson, 8 F. Supp. 87 (W. D. Mich. I934). See also notes 7, 12-13 supra; (2)
Absence of any other occupation, In re Rende, 19 F. Supp. 1022 (M. D. Pa. 1937)
(shoe repairing); In re McCoy, 17 F. Supp. 973 (W. D. La. 1936) (school teaching) ;
In re Peterson, 8 F. Supp. 87 (W. D. Mich. 1934) (trucking) ; In re Knight, 9 F.
Supp. 503 (D. Conn. 1934) (lunch stand); (3)'Supervision of farming operations, In
re Moser, 95 F. (2d) 944 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938); Evans v. Florida Nat. Bank, 38 F.
(2d) 627 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930). See also i COLLIM, op. cit. supra note 2, at 6o5.
29. In re Glick, 26 F. (2d) 398 (C. C. A. 7th, 1928).
30. In re Brais, 15 F. (2d) 693 (C. C. A. 7th, 1926) ; In re Cox, 9 F. Supp. 244
(S. D. Ill. 1935).
31. Chapter XI, which replaced the old §§ 74 and 12, was inapplicable since it deals
only with adjustment of unsecured debts.
32. Chandler Act, c. XII, ii U. S. C. A. §§ 701-799 (Supp. 194o).
33. Chapter XII deals primarily and directly with the adjustment of debts which
are secured by real property or chattels real of an individual or partnership. § 406 (2)
includes secured and unsecured claims, however. Section 468 provides that the arrange-
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In view of the fact that only a single creditor was involved here, and that
he had already strenuously resisted an agricultural composition, it was
unlikely that he would consent to any arrangement but payment in full or
involuntary bankruptcy.34 In requiring physical participation by the debtor
in the farming activities, and in ignoring the presence of other factors, both
this court and the court in the Nicholson case were unduly strict. Cer-
tainly, a more equitable result would have followed had the instant courts
considered those additional factors in the light of the policy underlying both
sections of the Act.
Conflict of Laws-Reasonableness of Foreign Service Deter-
mined by Local Law-Executor was sued in representative capacity
for an accounting in Florida court. Upon failure to account, a personal
judgment was rendered against him although service of the order nisi was
had only on the attorneys of record as allowed by local statute. In a suit
on this personal judgment in the Tennessee court it was held that the judg-
ment though valid under Florida law was not entitled to faith and credit in
Tennessee since the Florida court had not had "jurisdiction". Baskin v.
Montedonico, 115 Fed. (2d) 837 (C. C. A. 6th, 194o).
Where a personal judgment is rendered by a court which does not have
jurisdiction over the defendant, other states need not recognize the judg-
ment.' The constitutional requirement of "full faith and credit" 2 does not
preclude an investigation into the jurisdiction of the court rendering the
judgment,s and lack of jurisdiction will take the judgment out of the pro-
tection of the constitutional provision.4 The instant case is concerned with
the problem of reasonableness in the exercise of jurisdiction by the Florida
court. Service on the attorneys of record, though "reasonable" under
Florida law 5 was invalid under Tennessee law.6 The court properly applied
the -criteria of the forum to the question of reasonableness, since extra-
territorial recognition is predicated upon jurisdiction which is not contrary
to the principles of the common law 7 or due process, both of which require
ment must be accepted by creditors holding two-thirds in amount of debts of each class,
proved and allowed. Note 32 supra; WEINSTEIN, BANKRUPTcY LAW OF 1938 (1938)
260.
34. Instant case at 113. It is interesting to note that under old §§ 74 and 12 a
majority of cases involved a single creditor who generally blocked the composition.
WEINSTEIN, op. cit. supra note 33, at 260.
I. McEwan v. Zimmer, 38 Mich. 765 (1878) ; Bridger v. Mitchell, 187 N. C. 374,
121 S. E. 661 (1924) ; Royal Neighbors of America v. Fletcher, 99 Okla. 297, 227 Pac.
426 (1924) ; GOODRICH, CoNFLICr OF LAWS (2d ed. 1938) § 69. "A judgment rendered
against a defendant over whom the court has no jurisdiction on any ground is void."
I BzALE, CONFLICr OF LAWS (1935) 326.
2. "Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records and
judicial proceedings of every other state." U. S. CONsT. Art. IV, § I.
3. Bischoff v. Wethered, 9 Wall. 812 (U. S. 1869) ; Buttrick v. Allen, 8 Mass. 272
(i8ii) ; Tremblay v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 97 Me. 547, 55 Atl. 509 (I9o3).
4. Grover & Baker Sewing Machine Co. v. Radcliffe, 137 U. S. 287 (i89o); Na-
tional Exchange Bank v. Wiley, 195 U. S. 257 (19o4) ; Matera v. Hauptmann, 13 N. J.
Misc. 483, 179 Atl. 626 (935).
5. A Florida statute provides that "Notice . . . to or service upon a solicitor of
record shall have the same force and effect as personal notice . . . or service upon
the party represented by such solicitor". CoMp. GEN. LAWS FLA. ANN. (Cum. Supp.
1934) § 4920 (i). See also Sessions v. Willard, 126 Fla. 848, 172 So. 242 (937);
State v. Southerland, lO6 Fla. 103, 142 So. 883 (1932); cf. Epstein & Bro. v. First
Nat. Bank of Tampa, 92 Fla. 796, 110 So. 354 (1926).
6. Melton v. Pace, 1O3 Tenn. 484, 54 S. W. 939 (1899); Chandler v. White Oak
Creek Lumber Co., 131 Tenn. 47, 173 S. W. 499 (1914).
7. RFSTATEMENT, CONFLICr OF LAWS (1934) § 44.
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reasonable notice as a prerequisite to a valid judgment." The peculiar doc-
trine of the foreign law should not limit the power of the forum to repudiate
a judgment not based upon reasonable notice.a In the instant case the
jurisdiction over the executor in a representative capacity should not con-
tinue so as to support a judgment against him personally.10 The appearance
by the attorneys of record, who were served under the Florida statute,11 was
unauthorized as to a suit against the defendant in a personal capacity, and
the statute allowing this service should be invalid under the Fourteenth
Amendment even in Florida, and clearly not entitled to recognition in
Tennessee.12
Constitutional Law-Prevailing Wage Statute Declared Uncon-
stitutional-In a taxpayer's suit to enjoin awarding of public works
contracts under an Illinois statute which provides that not less than the
prevailing wage for the locality (as determined by the state agency mak-
ing the contract) shall be paid laborers and mechanics employed by con-
tractors on public works projects 1 the Court held (two judges dissenting),
the statute unconstitutional as abridging the right to contract and as an
improper delegation of legislative and judicial powers. Reid v. Smith, 30
N. E. (2d) 908 (Ill. 194o).
Legal archeology is enriched by this ceremonious disinterment of the
proposition that a state may not require a prevailing wage to be paid
laborers on public works contracts. The power of a municipality to do so,
without a legislative declaration of policy, has been denied 2 as a violation
of the policy in favor of letting public contracts to the "lowest responsible
bidder." 3 However, the state's power to declare a different policy by legis-
lative enactment 4 and to further such policy by refusing to contract on the
8. Id. at §§ 429, 75.
9. Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457 (U. S. 1873). Where a summons was
served by nailing a copy to the courthouse door of the Island of Tobago according to
local procedure, and the judgment so secured was sued upon in England, Lord Ellen-
borough cried, "Can the Island of Tobago pass a law to bind the rights of the whole
world?" Buchanan v. Rucker, 9 East i9z, 194, 1003 Eng. Rep. R. 546, 547 (I8o8).
io. See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, z4i U. S. 518 (igi6). "The court
has no jurisdiction, however, as to different causes of action not included in the orig-
inal action." i BE.ALE, op. cit. supra note I, at 338.
ii. See note 5 supra.
12. Hatfield v. King, 184 U. S. 162 (1o2); Harshey T. Blackmarr, 2o Iowa 161
(1866) ; Hanzes v. Flavio, 234 Mass. 320, 125 N. E. 612 (i92o) ; i BEALE, op. cit.
supra note i, at 331. Cf. RFsTATEmENT, op. cit. supra note 7, § 74, comment c.
I. ILL. LAws 1939, p. 568, which became law without signature of the governor.
It provides, a (§ i) payment of prevailing rate of per diem wages for work of a sim-
ilar character in the locality in which the work is performed, and b (§ 2) that the public
body awarding the contract ascertain the "prevailing rate of per diem wages in the
locality" for each craft or type of workman or mechanic employed and specify the as-
certained wages in the call for bids, with provision for judicial review of the deter-
minations, c (§ 2) that the contractor pay a penalty ($1o) for every violation to the pub-
lic body awarding the contract, d (§ 4) that "locality" mean the political subdivisions
within which the work was to be performed, and e (§ 5) that failure to comply with
the act be a misdemeanor.
2. Bohn v. Salt Lake City, 79 Utah 121 8 P. (2d) 591 (1932) ; Mayor v. Employ-
ers' Ass'n, 162 Md. 124, i59 AtI. 267 (I932) ; Frame v. Felix, 167 Pa. 47, 31 At. 375
(895). Contra: Wagner v. Milwaukee, i8o Wis. 640, 192 N. W. 994 (1923).
3. See Atty. General v. Detroit, 25 Mich. 631, i96 N. W. 391 (1923); Malette
v. Spokane, 77 Wash. 205, 137 Pac. 496 (913). Instant case at 915.
4. Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U. S. 113, 127 (940) ; Campbell v. New York
City, 244 N. Y. 317, is5 N. E. 628 (927); Norris v. Lawton, 47 Okla. 213, 148 Pac.
123 (1915).
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basis of a substandard wage s is hardly questionable today. 6 Whatever
spectre of unconstitutionality may have been raised by decisions holding
the wording of similar statutes too indefinite to warrant criminal prosecu-
tion of contractors violating their provisions 7 has subsequently been laid
in cases where enforcement of criminal sanctions was not involved.8 The
contribution of the Illinois court is buttressed by the rather unsubstantial
argument that delegation of determination of a "prevailing wage" involves
unconstitutional delegation of legislative or judicial power.9 And implicit
in its conclusion may be the realization that "prevailing standard" today
can hardly be other than "union wage". Delegation to a union of power
to fix wages would of course be unconstitutional.' However, the decision
seems best explicable as an articulation of judicial revolt against the legis-
lature's regulation of wages even in public contracts by any means."' That
such a view is anachronistic, particularly in view of the fact that the vital
issue in other jurisdictions is now the question of regulation of wages in
private industry,12 does not abash the court. "A reconsideration of matters
S. Cases cited notes 3 and 4 supra. Contra: Street v. Varney Electrical Supply
Co., 16o Ind. 338, 66 N. E. 895 (19o3); Rogers v. Coler, 166 N. Y. I, 59 N. E. 716
(19Ol). There are statutes of this nature in thirty-four jurisdictions. See collection
of statutes in 2 C. C. H. Labor Law Serv. 145,o22, and see Walsh-Healey Act, 49
STAT. 2036-2039 (940), 41 U. S. C. A. §§ 35-45, § i and ib. There have apparently
been no contrary decisions between the Indiana case and the instant case, and it may,
be noted that in 1935 Indiana enacted a statute hardly essentially different from that
invalidated in the Street case. IND. Acrs (1935) c. 319, P. 1535. New York has'also
adopted a contrary view, but only after constitutional amendment. Campbell v. New
York City, 244 N. Y. 317, 155 N. E. 628 (1927). The amendment, however, was not
held controlling by Cardozo in his opinion in this case. And it has been settled law
since 1903 that a state may regulate hours of persons working on public contracts. At-
kins v. Kansas, 191 U. S. 207 (1903).
6. See the excellent dissenting opinion in the instant case at page 912.
7. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U. S. 385 (1925); State v. Blaser, 138
Kan. 447, 26 P. (2d) 593 (933).
8. State v. Anklam, 43 Ariz. 362, 31 P. (2d) 888 (1934) ; see State v. Blaser, 138
Kan. 447, 26 P. (2d) 593 (1933) ; Notes (1937) 85 U. oF PA. L. REV. 297, 304, (I934)
34 COL. L. REV. 733, and see Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 31o U. S. 113 (1940).
9. On the basis of the uncertainty of the words "prevailing standard", which may
vary from minimum to maximum with all that is between. Connally v. General Constr.
Co., 269 U. S. 385 (1925). But it seems that determination of prevailing rate could
hardly involve more than striking of a balance among easily determinable scales of pay.
Greater discretion has been delegated to administrative bodies without effective challenge.
See John v. Seattle, 12o Wash. 403, 410, 207 Pac. 667 (1922). Further, the instant stat-
ute is free from the ambiguity as to the word "locality", which caused the dispute in
the Lukens case.
The question of delegation of judicial power, while no stronger, was not raised by
the facts in this appeal, and in view of the separability clause in the act need not have
been discussed. For the issue was raised by taxpayers suing to prevent waste of tax
funds. No contractor was here complaining of deprivation of due process.
io. Wagner v. Milwaukee, 177 Wis. 410, 188 N. W. 487 (1922); Cf. Carter v. Car-
ter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 31o (1936).
Ii. See Cheadle, The Parrish Case: Minimum Wages for Women and, Perhaps,
for Men (1937) II U. OF CiN. L. REv. 307, for a discussion of judicial obstruction of
minimum wage legislation. The "public works" statutes are concededly an attempt by
the state to regulate wages as completely as is constitutionally possible.
It seems then to be yet possible for "those who would like to decide such questions
by a mere appeal to liberty and freedom of contract to avert 'the tragedy of a fact
killing a theory by putting a constitutional sanction behind a cherished dogma'" See
Williston, Freedom of Contract (1921) 6 CoaN. L. Q. 365, 379, quoting Felix Frank-
furter's brief in Children-'s Hospital v. Adkins, 284 Fed. 613 (App. D. C. 1922).
12. Fair Labor Standards Act, 52 STAT. io6o, 29 U. S. C. A. § 201 (Supp. 1940),
upheld in United States v. F. W. Darby Lumber Co., 6r Sup. Ct. 451 (941) (as to
due process and the commerce clause), and Opp Cotton Mills v. Admr., 61 Sup. Ct. 46
(941) (as to delegation of legislative power). See Cheadle, loc. cit. .upra note io.
Such cases are indicative of the trend of judicial thought concerning the policy behind
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long established as settled law" will not be invited in Illinois."' Ephraim
is wedded to his idols.
Criminal Law-Conviction for Attempt Where Commission of
Full Crime Was Impossible-The defendant, a hotel runner, ap-
proached two policewomen whom he supposed to be travelers. They stated
that they intended to go to a certain hotel but later, pretending to rely on
his misrepresentations, accompanied defendant. Held (one justice dissent-
ing),' the defendant is guilty of an attempt under a statute making it a
misdemeanor to divert any travelers from the hotel of their choice.2 People
v. Boord, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 792 (Ist Dep't, App. Div. 194o).
The statement of any general rule as to criminal attempts is difficult3
due to confusion as to the intent necessary 4 and as to the effect of impos-
sibility of completing the full crime.5 The best results are reached by con-
sidering an attempt as a distinct crime,6 related to the full crime only 7 in
that defendant must intend it." In determining intent some consideration
must be given to defendant's belief as to the object upon which his senses
focused.9 Thus an indictment for attempt to commit statutory rape in
the statute in question. But the court, of course, need not have determined the question
of policy, note 4 supra. Nor should it have. See generally, Williston, note ii snpra.
13. Instant case at 913.
i. The learned judge based his dissent on the grounds of the Jaffe case, saying
that "where, if the accused has completed the act which he attempted to do, he would
not be guilty of a criminal offense," he could not be guilty of the attempt. See instant
case at 796 (dissenting opinion). It is submitted that the Jaffe case is not on point as
Jaffe was indicted under a statute requiring knowledge that the goods were stolen.
He was released because "The defendant could not know that the property possessed
the character of stolen property when it had not in fact been acquired by thief." The
question of his intent was not contested. The court said, "The crime of which the
defendant was convicted necessarily consists of three elements: first, the act; second,
the intent; and third, the knowledge of an existing condition. There was proof tending
to establish two of these elements, the first and the second, but none to establish the
existence of the third." People v. Jaffe 155 N. Y. 497, 501, 78 N. E. i69, i7o (igo6).
2. N. Y. CoNs. LAws (Cahill, I93O) C. 41, § 925a.
3. Hicks v. Commonwealth, 86 Va. 223, 226, 9 S. E. 1024, 1025 (i898), where the
court in speaking of criminal attempts states, "And it may be added that it is more in-
tricate and difficult of comprehension than any other branch of the criminal law."
4. Sayer, Criminal Attempts (1928) 41 H, v. L. REV. 821, 837, where he states,
"The modem law of criminal attempts allows convictions in some cases of unsuccessful
efforts to commit criminal offenses and denies convictions in others. The decisions do
not make it altogether clear just how criminality is to be determined."
5. Strahorn, The Effect of Impossibility on Criminal Attempts (1930) 78 U. oF
PA. L. REv. 962. "A much-mooted problem is whether the attempt is a criminal one
when the complete crime attempted has failed because of the utter impossibility of its
being achieved-under the circumstances."
6. Curran, Crimtinal and Non-Criminal Attempts (93) ip GEO. L. J. I85, 337,
where it is stated, "If the attempt is viewed as a distinct crime without relating or
making it dependent upon another crime, most of the confusion in this controversy will
be avoided."
7. Id. at i86: "The crimes are mutually exclusive. There seems to be no reason
why an attempt should be defined one way in law and another in life." Contra: Arnold,
Criminal Attempts-The Rise and Fall of an Abstraction (1931) 40 YALr L. J. 53, 76,
where it is stated: "a criminal attempt is not a substantive crime without reference to
the thing attempted, and the concept of it as such is not a workable legal device." To
the same effect see Beale, Criminal Attempts (I9O3) I6 HARv. L. REV. 491.
8. The act must be done with the specific intent to commit the particular crime the
accused is charged with attempting to commit." CLA u, CmMNAL LAW (Mikell's ed.
191S) 148; (1932) 82 U. oF PA. L. Rxv. 631; Sayer, note 4 supra, at 851, states, "...
the defendant . . . must be proved (r) to have actually intended to effectuate what
constitutes the criminal attempt, . .
?. It is to be noted that on this point the distinction between the defendant's motive
and intent is very fine.
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having intercourse with a girl over 16, believing her to be under 16, was
thought by the dissenting justice to be analogous to the instant case.10
However, in the rape case since defendant's intent was directed towards the
girl not because he thought she was under 16 (the class which the state
protects) but merely because she was a girl, the intent to effectuate
the crime is lacking.1 In the instant case the defendant approached the
policewomen not merely as women, but rather because he thought they were
travelers.12 The intent was to divert persons of that class, and as the leg-
islature has shown its interest in protecting that class the requisite intent
was present. 3 The court properly treated the impossibilit' of the defend-
ant's committing the full crime as immaterial,' resting the conviction on the
presence of the specific intent to effectuate the full crime.15
Damages-Measure of Damages Under Pennsylvania Survival
Statute-Pennsylvania has two statutory remedies for wrongful death.
The "death statute" ' permits recovery by certain close relatives, principally
for loss of support, while the "survival statute" 2 provides that all causes of
action, except defamation, available to the deceased, survive to his personal
representative. Where no relative capable of suing under the death statute
was living, the personal representative was held entitled to recover earnings
based on life expectancy. Kriesak v. Crowe, 36 F. Supp. 127 (M. D. Pa.
1940).
The "death statute" provides deceased's immediate family with a cause
of action based on loss of support.' Damages under this statute include at
least a part of deceased's prospective earnings. The "survival statute" pro-
vides that all causes of action which the deceased had survive to the personal
representative.4  Since the deceased could have sued for his total loss of
Io. "..., then, in accordance with the prevailing opinion, we must hereafter hold
that an attempt to commit rape in the second degree is committed even though the vic-
tim is above the statutory age if it appears that the defendant thought her to be less."
See instant case at 797 (dissenting opinion).
ii. Strahorn, note 5 supra at 971, says, "This problem, in other terms, is whether
the impossibility negatives the requisite impairment of the interest, which is protected
by. the involved prohibition."
12. Instant case at 793, 794.
13. See note 2 supra.
14. Instant case at 794, "Guilt of an attempt depends upon intent and conduct with-
out regard to the actual consequences of that conduct." To the same effect see People
v. Moore, i42 App. Div. 402, I27 N. Y. Supp. 98 (ist Dep't 191i), aff'd, 20 N. Y. 570,
95 N. E. 1 136 (1911) ; People v. Gardner, 144 N. Y. 119, 38 N. E. 03 (1894).
15. Sayer, note 4 supra, at 85o, where it is stated, ". . . when a defendant
because of his mistake could not possibly cause the desired criminal consequence, he
should be convicted if allowing him to go free would menace social interests through
the danger of repetition."
1. "Whenever death shall be occasioned by unlawful violence or negligence, and
no suit for damages be brought by the party injured during .his or her life, the widow
of any such deceased, or if there be no widow, the personal representatives may
maintain an action ,for and recover damages for the death thus occasioned." PA. STAT.
ANN. (Purdon, 193) tit. 12 § i6oi.
"The persons entitled to recover damages for any injuries causing death shall be
the husband, widow, children, or parents of the deceased, and no other relatives . .
PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon Supp. 1940) tit. 12 § I6o2.
2. "Executors or administrators shall have the power, either alone or jointly with
other plaintiffs, to commence and prosecute . . . all personal actions which the
decedent whom they represent might have commenced and prosecuted, except actions
for slander and for libels . . ." PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon Supp. 1940) tit. 20 §772.
3. Penna. R. R. v. Butler, 57 Pa. 335 (1868) ; see Glaesser v. Evans, 36 D. & C.
68, 72-3 (Pa. 1939) ; Gannon v. Lawler, 34 D. & C. 571, 576 (Pa. 1939).
4. Gannon v. Lawler, 34 D. & C. 571 (Pa. 1939) ; see Voelkel v. Bennett, 31 F.
Supp. 5o6, 5o8 (E. D. Pa. I94o), aff'd ii5 F. (2d) io2 (C. C. A. 3d, I940).
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prospective earnings, the personal representative is permitted to recover the
same. The two statutes are said to provide cumulative rather than alterna-
tive causes of action against the tort-feasor,5 with the result that there is
logically an overlapping of damages. To avoid making the tort-feasor pay
twice, some courts have deducted from the damages to be recovered under
the survival statute those which could be recovered under the death
statute.6 One court has suggested a rule of damages, more adaptable to
varied situations, but clumsy and speculative in application, whereby the
finder of fact would determine the amount to be awarded under each statute
by estimating the percentage of earnings which would have been used to
support the immediate family of the deceased (allotted to the relatives under
the death statute) ; and by estimating the present value of the amount which
would have been accumulated at the end of deceased's expectable life
(allotted to the personal representative under the survival statute). 7 In the
instant case where no one could sue under the death statute," there was no
possibility of double damages, and all loss of earnings was recovered under
the survival statute.9 The court seemed to say that the rule of damages
under the survival statute will differ according to whether or not there is a
possibility of recovery under the death statute.10 A desirable result was
5. That the statutes create separate and distinct causes of action, not merely
alternative remedies, has been generally agreed. Voelkel v. Bennett, 115 F. (2d) 102
(C. C. A. 3d, 1940) ; Glaesser v. Evans, 36 D. & C. 68 (Pa. 1939) ; Gannon v. Lawler,
34 D. & C. 571 (Pa. 1939). Logically, if the remedies are in fact cumulative, re-
covery of damages under either of the statutes should not preclude recovery of the
same item of damages under the other statute.
6. In order to avoid double damages, the courts were faced with the necessity of
limiting recovery under one or the other of the wrongful death statutes. Since the
rule of damages under the "death statute" has been well settled from the middle of
the nineteenth century, they have chosen to modify the measure of damages under the
"survival statute". Gannon v. Lawler, 34 D. & C. 571, 577 (Pa. 1939); Glaesser v.
Evans, 36 D. & C. 68 (Pa. 1939). These courts necessarily concluded, in spite of
the wording of the "survival statute", that the cause of action given the personal
representative is not the same, nor is the measure of damages the same, as it would
hiave been had the deceased brought the action. See Gannon v. Lawler, 34 D. & C.
571, 577 (Pa. 1939).
The most common arbitrary limitation of damages under the "survival statute",
popular because of its simplicity, is to apportion to the personal representative suing
under the "survival statute" damages for the loss of earnings only between the time
of injury and the time of death. Glaesser v. Evans, 36 D. & C. 68 (Pa. 1939);
Gannon v. Lawler, 34 D. & C. 571 (Pa. 1939) ; see Voelkel v. Bennett, 115 F. (2d)
io2, 104 (C. C. A. 3d, 1940). This limitation has proved expedient where actions
under both statutes have been litigated together, but is unsatisfactory where, as in the
instant case, no action can be pursued under the "death statute".
7. Judge Goodrich, in Voelkel v. Bennett, 115 F. (2d) 102, 104-5 (C. C. A. 3d,
194o), although not deciding the problem, recommended that the jury be allowed to
estimate the net amount that the deceased would have accumulated if he had lived out
his normal life expectancy, to be recovered under the "survival statute". In theory,
the amount so arrived at would necessarily exclude the amounts which would have
been spent for himself and his immediate family, the family being provided for under
the "death statute".
8. Even brothers and sisters, no matter how dependent upon the deceased, cannot
recover under the "death statute". Eifler v. Anderson, i= Pa. Super. 547, x86 AtL
323 (936).
9. Instant case at 129. Prior to the instant decision, only one case had come up
under the "survival statute" alone, though there it did appear that there was no one
capable of taking under the "death statute". It was there stated that damages under
the "death statute" could not affect the measure of damages under the "survival
statute". Lutge v. Rosin, 32 D. & C. 338, 343 (Pa. 1938).
io. "Since the present suit"involves no possibility of double recovery from the
tort-feasor, there is no reason why this rule [that damages under the "survival
statute" are no different from those which the deceased himself could have recovered
if he had lived to bring the action] should not be applied to the suit now brought.
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reached by fabricating the rule to fit the facts. There is ample justification
for this in view of the impossibility of formulating a rule of universal appli-
cation to apportion damages under the existing statutes. The case is an
illustration of the confusion which has arisen and will continue to arise as
the statutes are interpreted in the light of new fact situations and as make-
shift rules are applied to the fact situations. The only solution seems to lie
in an early revision of the statutes with special attention to the allocation
of damages." Both court and jury will then be relieved of an intricate and
useless exercise.
Evidence-Admissibility in Federal Court of Information Ille-
gally Seized but Otherwise Available-Federal agents wrongfully
seized papers which they were privileged to inspect on the premises. Held,
papers returned on petition, but information obtained therefrom not sup-
pressed. Matter of Sana Laboratories, Inc., 115 F. (2d) 717 (C. C. A.
3d, I94O).
Federal courts to deter unconstitutional searches and seizures 1 exclude
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 2  In the instant
case federal agents, already possessing strong evidence of defendant's guilt,"
entered without objection and wrongfully 4 seized papers which they were
privileged to inspect on the premises,5 and which they might also have
forced defendant to produce in court by subpoena, since corporations are not
protected against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment. 6 In pre-
vious similar cases federal courts have followed the exclusion theory and
enjoined the use of all information gained after the wrong.7 The court dis-
It is proper for the plaintiff administratrix to include a claim for damages for loss
of earning power during decedent's normal life expectancy." Instant case at 129.
ii. Though no statutory revision has occurred, the procedure to be followed by
the parties has been modified by PA. RULES CIV. PRoc. (939), Rule 2202. By its
terms, all actions brought for wrongful death within six months of the death must
be brought in the name of the personal representative. The practical effect of this
is that actions under both statutes can be instituted together by the same person.
There is no necessity, however, for the consolidation of the actions, for a notation
following the Rule states that it is not intended to affect the operation of the "sur-
vival statute". The issue of damages, also, appears to remain unaffected by the Rule.
I. This policy is the only defensible reason for the federal rule, Chafee, The
Progress of the Law i91P-1922 (1922) 35 HAnv. L. REv. 673, 695; (1940) 89 U. OF
PA. L. REv. 240.
2. 8 WIGMORE, EvmiExcE (3d ed. 1940) § 2184. The Fourth Amendment pro-
vides that "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated . . ." At
common law and in most states admissibility of evidence is not affected by illegality
of procurement, WIGNM0Eo, EVIDENCE §2183.
3. They had seen a truck leave defendant's premises loaded with barrels from
which the serial numbers had been removed in violation of the applicable Treasury
Regulations, instant case at 7M7.
4. The opinion assumed that seizure was unlawful. Since the privilege of search
was given in derogation of the Fourth Amendment, it should not be broadly inter-
preted to include the right of seizure, Brief for Appellant, p. 5, Case No. 748o, C. C.
A. 3d, Oct. Term, 1940. Cf. United States v. Kraus, 27o Fed. 578 (S. D. N. Y.
1921) at 581: "... it is clear that the right to inspect did not give the right to
seize."
5. U. S. Treas. Reg. 3, Arts. 148, 167.
6. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43 (1906); WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2259a.
7. Silverthorue Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385 (1920) (corporate
record subject to subpcena), Holmes, J., at 392, "The essence of a provision Sorbid-
ding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so ac-
quired shall not be used before the court but that it shall not be used at all." United
States v. Kraus, 27o Fed. 578 (S. D. N. Y. 1921) (records open to inspection under
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tinguished such cases on the ground that there the search was illegal from
inception.8 The fact that here only the seizure was illegal would not
support the difference in result, since both are restrained by the Fourth
Amendment. The only factual distinction is that in the instant case it was
certain that a legal investigation would have produced the same records and
information; whereas in other cases it is more doubtful. 9 It may be argued
that in the instant case the information was in fact gained through the
wrong, that mere return of the papers is neither adequate remedy for in-
fringement of defendant's constitutional immunity nor a strong deterrent
against future violations, 10 and that therefore the usual policy requires
exclusion of the evidence. However, the Fourth Amendment does not
specifically invalidate evidence illegally obtained. The only justification for
holding that it does is to read it with the Fifth,' 1 and this is precluded in
the instant case, where defendant, as a corporation, is not protected by the
latter. The question of constitutionality of the seizure is at best collateral
to the issue of the competency of the evidence.' - Where all the information
was otherwise available, the necessity of efficient enforcemnt of the criminal,
law 13 outweighs the policy of indirect enforcement of the Fourth Amend-
ment and supports the court's ruling.
Insurance-Recovery of Insurance on Property Illegally Pos-
sessed-Defendant company contracted to insure against burglary
certain gambling machines, the possession and operation of which was pro-
hibited by local ordinance.1 The insured seeks recovery on the insurance
contract. Held, contract was unenforceable because it tended to encourage
illegal activities. Northwest Amusement Co., Inc. v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co., 107 P. (2d) iO (Ore. 194o).
the Volstead Act). This is not a necessary result. Cf. the order of the District
Court in the instant case that papers be returned "subject to inspection by the Gov-
ernment on request . . ." quoted in Brief for Appellant, p. 23, Case No. 748o,
C. C. A. 3d, Oct. Term, 194o.
8. "There (in the Kraus case) the proceedings were unlawful from their incep-
tion because the officers effected a forcible entry . . . In the instant case, there
was no unlawful entry," Goodrich, 3., instant case at 718.
9. For instance in many cases the government would not know whether such
records were kept or which ones to subpoena without a previous illegal search. In
the instant case the inspectors would have known exactly what to look for.
io. The ineffectiveness of private actions for trespass or of public prosecutions
against offending detectives is discussed in Atkinson, Admissibility of Ezidence Ob-
tained Through Unreasonable Searches and Seiaures (1925) 25 COL. L. REV. ii;
(1940) 89 U. OF PA. L. REv. 241, n. 10.
ii. The historical origins of the two amendments were quite different, (194o) 89
U. OF PA. L. REV. 241, n. 5. However, scholars have advanced the theory that a
common philosophical principle underlies both, Atkinson, note IO supra.
12. Wigmore characterizes the position of the federal courts thus: "Titus, you
have been found guilty of conducting a lottery; Flavius, you have confessedly vio-
lated the Constitution. Titus ought to suffer imprisonment for crime, and Flavius
for contempt. But no! . . . Our way of upholding the Constitution is not to strike
at the man who breaks it, but to let off somebody else who broke something else."
WiGuoRE, EvIDENcE § 2184. The fact that the point is made in pre-trial motion
does not change this. "The point is that the fact of illegality of method in obtain-
ing evidential material is a collateral fact to the main issue; and all the motions
in the world will not make it anything else." Ibid.
13. See Knox, Self-Iwrimination (1925) 74 U. OF PA. L. Ray. 139.
i. "It shall be unlawful to set up, keep or have in possession or to manufac-
ture, sell or distribute within the city of Portland any nickel-in-the-slot machine or
similar device adapted, devised or designed for the purpose of playing any
gane of chance for money or property ... " Section 13-I, Ordinance No. 32928,
City of Portland.
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Contracts insuring property which is being used for an illegal purpose
are said to be valid if the property is not directly related to the illegal enter-
prise,2 or if the property is capable of being used legally.3  On the other
hand, if the property is closely connected with the illegal enterprise,4 or
incapable of being used legally,- the courts are apt to hold the insurance
void, saying that it promotes illegal and immoral conduct. In the instant
case, the insured's possession of the gambling machines was ipso facto a
violation of local ordinance. Since the gambling machines were the essence
of the insured's illegal enterprise, to remove the risk of their loss encouraged
it.6 The court, therefore, refused to enforce the contract in favor of the
insured. Against the decision of the court is the argument that the insur-
ance eliminated only a risk incident to property ownership, rather than a
risk arising from the illegality of the enterprise involved, and that therefore
the illegality of the enterprise was no bar to recovery of the insurance.7
The doctrine of pari delicto supports the court in its refusal to enforce a
contract which encouraged an act which the government had made criminal
in itself." The result, however, is to leave the insurance company in pos-
session of premiums paid under the same illegal contract, and it is possible
that the insured's attempt to recover in quasi-contract would fail because of
"unclean hands". The best argument in support of so harsh a decision is
that it may deter the insured from the illegal enterprise. It is unnecessary
to impose a similar deterrent on the company, which may well have entered
2. Phenix Ins. Co. v. Clay, ioi Ga. 331, 28 S. E. 853 (1897) (insurance on
property used for purposes of prostitution); Erb v. German-American Ins. Co., 98
Iowa 6o6, 67 N. W. 583 (1897) (insurance on liquor) ; Conithan v. Royal Ins. Co.,
9I Miss. 386, 45 So. 361 (19o7) (insurance on property used for purposes of pros-
titution) ; Carrigan v. Lycoming Fire Ins. Co., 53 Vt. 418 (1881) (insurance on
liquor); VANcE, INSURANCE (2d ed. i93o) § 75; 6 WLisToN, CONTRACTS (1938)
§ 1752. See generally Notes (1922) I8 A. L. R. 1084, (191o) i5 Ann. Cas. 539.
"A bargain collaterally and remotely connected with an illegal purpose or act
is not rendered illegal thereby if proof of the bargain can be made without relying
upon the illegal transaction." RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 597.
"How closely a bargain must be connected with an illegal purpose in order to
make the bargain itself illegal is a question of degree." Id. at comment a. But see
Illus. I, § 597.
3. Wood v. First Nat. Fire Ins. Co., 21 Ga. App. 333, 339, 94 S. E. 622, 735
(1917) (dissenting opinion) (insurance on liquor); Ins. Co. of North America v.
Evans, 64 Kan. 77o, 68 Pac. 623 (1902) (insurance on liquor) ; Carrigan v. Lycom-
ing Fire Ins. Co., 53 Vt. 418 (1881); VANCE, loc. cit. supra note 2; 6 Wnu.sToN,
loc. cit. supra note 2.
4. Vos v. Albany Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 191 Minn. 197, 253 N. W. 549 (1934)
(insurance on a building containing an illegal still) ; Conithan v. Royal Ins. Co., 91
Miss. 386, 397, 45 So. 361, 363 (I97) (dissenting opinion) ; Dominion Fire Ins. Co.
v. Nakata, 52 Can. Sup. Ct. 294 (915) (insurance on property used for purposes
of prostitution) ; VAN E loc. cit. supra note 2; 6 WiLusoN, loc. cit. supra note 2.
5. Craig v. U. S. Ins. Co., 6 Fed. Cas. 733, No. 3340 (C. C. Pa. 1814) (insur-
ance on illegal cargo) ; Gray v. Sims, io Fed. Cas. lO39, No. 5729 (C. C. Pa. 1814)
(insurance on illegal cargo); Wood v. First Nat. Fire Ins. Co., 21 Ga. App. 333,
94 S. E. 622 (1917) ; Benton v. Hope & Tally, 19 La. Ann. 463 (1867) (insurance
on illegal cargo); Kelly v. Home Ins. Co., 97 Mass. 288 (1867) (insurance on
liquor); Mount v. Waite, 7 Johns. (N. Y.) 434 (18ii) (insurance on lottery
tickets); VANCE, loc. cit. spra note 2; 6 WnzzsToN, loc. cit. supra note 2.
6. See notes 4 and 5 supra.
7. Ins. Co. of North America v. Evans, 64 Kan. 77o, 68 Pac. 623 (902).
8. Wood v. First Nat. Ins. Co., 21 Ga. App. 333, 94 S. E. 622 (917); Kelly
v. Home Ins. Co., 97 Mass. 288 (i867); Vos v. Albany Mutual Ins. Co., 191 Minn.
179, 253 N. W. 549 (934). "In the instant case the ordinance, which, as stated, has
been held by this court to be valid, prohibited the possession of slot machines; the
policy in suit purported to insure against the loss of such possession by burgary.
Construing the policy as if the terms of the ordinance were written therein, in effect
such policy undertook to insure against the loss of a nonexistent right, namely the
right of possession of slot machines in the city of Portland." Instant case at 1i4.
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the contract innocently, and which was not and could not be the originator
of the illegal scheme.
Labor Law-Collective Bargaining Rights of Employees of Non-
Profit Institutions-Alleging that the plaintiff, a non-profit hospital,
was guilty of an unfair labor practice under the Pennsylvania Labor Rela-
tions Act for refusing to recognize the defendant union, the latter peti-
tioned the Labor Relations Board. Plaintiff sought to restrain the Board
from exercising jurisdiction. Held, injunction granted on the ground that
hospital employees are not subject to either the Anti-injunction I or Labor
Relations Act.2 Western Pennsylvania Hospital v. Lichliter, 340 Pa. 382,
17 A. (2d) 2o,6 (194).
The instant decision is an example of the lack of judicial enthusiasm
for availing to particular classes of workers the protection of existing labor
legislation.3 The injunction in the principal case represents the court's
left-handed method of forestalling the possibility that the care of hospital
patients might be disrupted by union strikes.' For reaching the desired
end, legalistic reasonings are ample. When employees of the state are
excluded from the collective bargaining acts, as was the situation in the
Lichliter case,5 the courts rationalize that employees of hospitals supported
in part by state appropriations are performing a state function and there-
fore fall within this category.6 It seems extremely doubtful in the absence
of other evidences of supervision and control that such financial aid in
itself can be sufficient to make the hospital a governmental agency. An-
other approach is to attribute the need of labor legislation as a protection
against profit-making organizations and consequently to view eleemosynary
institutions as the quintescence of virtue.7  One court blankly states, "It
has not been the custom in the past to unionize hospitals." 8 The attitude
of the courts, as witnessed by the above reasoning, indicates a curiously
placed emphasis. Admittedly the intent of the legislature was to restore
equality of bargaining power between employer and employee. 9 An ele-
vator operator may be as much deprived of freedom of association or lib-
erty of contract whether employed in a hospital or in a private factory.
Furthermore, in view of the case of American Federation of Labor v.
Swingo10 which held that an injunction against peaceful picketing was a
denial of the worker's freedom of speech, it would seem clear that the right
to picket, strike, or join a union is available even to employees of non-
x. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. i94o) tit. 43, § 2o6 (a) et seq.
2. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1940) tit. 43, § 211.i et seq.
3. Another example might be found in a recent case which relied upon the Lich-
liter case as authority, Complaint of the United Cemetery Workers Union, Local No.
68o, Phila. Legal Intelligencer, February 18, 1941, p. 8, col. 3.
4. "It is a question of protecting the health, safety and, in many cases, the very
lives of those persons who need the service a hospital is organized to render!' Instant
case at 387.
S. N. Y. STAT. ANN. (McKinney, 1940) tit. 30, § 715; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon,
Supp. 1940) tit. 43, § 211.3 (C).
6. Instant case at 389. See also Jewish Hospital of Brooklyn v. John Doe, 252
App. Div. 581, 300 N. Y. Supp. 3r11 (2d Dep't 1937).
7. Jewish Hospital of Brooklyn v. John Doe, 252 App. Div. 58r, 300 N. Y. Supp.
iIun (2d Dep't 1937).
8. Instant case at 387.
9. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. i94o) tit. 43, § 21r.r.
io. 6r Sup. Ct. 568 (1941), 89 U. oF PA. L. REV. 825. For the development of the
trend emphasizing the free speech aspects of picketing see Senn v. Tile Layers Union,
301 U. S. 468 (1937) ; Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (194o) ; Carlson v. Califor-
nia, 310 U. S. io6 (x94o).
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profit institutions." Consequently the solution to 'labor disputes offered
by the instant case suggests more harm than good in that an orderly settle-
ment by the Labor Board of many alleged labor grievances must of neces-
sity be supplanted by the originally unwanted strike. It would seem that
encouragement of an efficiently organized union capable of preventing
wildcat strikes, together with governmental supervision through the State
Labor Relations Board, plus reliance on public opinion which becomes
particularly sensitive in situations similar to those in the instant case,
afford a sounder long range approach to the entire problem.
Landlord and Tenanit-Public Use Doctrine Not Applied to Doc-
tor's Office-Landlord leased a dwelling to doctor to be used as a pro-
fessional office. The tenant's patient, injured through a defect in a path
within the leased premises, sued landlord. Held, judgment for defendant;
the use of the premises contemplated in the lease was not a public one and
does not place the case within the exception to the general rule of landlord
non-liability. La Freda v. Woodworth, 15 A. (2d) 798 (N. J. L. 194o).
It is generally stated that a landlord has no duty to transfer leased
premises in good condition.' The burden of repair is said to fall entirely
on the tenant. But an exception to this rule has been made where land
has been leased for a purpose involving the admission of the public and
where a business invitee of the tenant has been injured by a defect in the
premises which existed at the time the tenant took possession.
2 For the
exception to apply, the landlord must have had reason to know that there
was an unreasonable risk of injury to persons coming on the land for the
purpose' for which it was leased.3 Lessors of public wharves were first
held liable under this exception.4 It was later held that lessors of public
amusement places were also under a duty to repair before leasing,
5 especially
where, because of the shortness of the lease, they should have realized that
the tenants would not repair.6 Recent cases have applied the public use
ii. But cf. Jewish Hospital of Brooklyn v. John Doe, 252 App. Div. 581, 3oo N. Y.
Supp. IIII (2d Dep't 1937).
I. BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAw OF TORTS (1926) 207-8; 2 RESTATEMENT, TORTS
(934) §356; I TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT (1910) 556, 649, 652; Eldredge,
Landlords Tort Liability for Disrepair (1936) 84 U. OF PA. L. REV. 467, 472.
2. 2 RESTATEMENT, TORTS (2934) § 359. The defect may have resulted from dis-
repair. Oxford v. Leathe, 165 Mass. 254, 43 N. E. 92 (1896) ; Tulsa Entertainment
Co. v. Greenlees, 85 Okla. 113, 205 Pac. 179 (922). Or it may have been due to faulty
construction. Webel v. Yale University, 125 Conn. 515, 7 A. (2d) 215 (1939) ; Bar-
rett v. Lake Ontario Beach Imp. Co., 174 N. Y. 31o, 66 N. E. 968 (903).
3. The landlord must have had reason to know that the tenant would not fulfill his
duty to repair. See note 6 infra.
4. Albert v. State, 66 Md. 325, 7 AtI. 697 (1887) ; Swords v. Edgar, 59 N. Y. 28
(874).
5. Oxford v. Leathe, 165 Mass. 254, 43 N. E. 92 (1896) ; Jnkermann v. Tilyou
Realty Co., 213 N. Y. 404, io8 N. E. 19o (1915); Folkman v. Lauer, 244 Pa. 6o5, 91
Atl. 218 (1914) ; Larson v. Calder's Park Co., 54 Utah 325, 18o Pac. 599 (i929). But
see Jackson v. Public Service Co., 86 N. H. 81, 86, 163 Atl. 504, 5o6 (1932).
6. 2 RESTATEMENT, TORTS (I934) § 359 (b). Oxford v. Leathe, I65 Mass. 254, 43
N. E. 92 (1896); Fox v. Buffalo Park, 21 App. Div. 321, 47 N. Y. Supp. 788 (4th
Dep't 1897), aff'd, 163 N. Y. 559, 57 N. E. 2220 (19oo). In Barrett v. Lake Ontario
Beach Imp. Co., 174 N. Y. 31o, 66 N. E. 968 (i903), a provision in the lease prohibited
repairs by the lessee without the consent of the lessor. But even the lessee's covenant to
repair has been held insufficient to entitle the lessor to expect that the premises will be
repaired before the public is admitted. Colorado Mortgage & Invest. Co. v. Giacomini,
55 Colo. 540, 36 Pac. 2O39 (1913); Swords v. Edgar, 59 N. Y. 28 (1874). RESTATE-
MENT, TORTS (1934) § 359, comment f.
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doctrine to hotels, 7 garages, s stores, 9 beauty parlors,10 rooming houses,"
and doctors' offices. 1 2 However, the court in the principal case rested its
decision entirely on the fact that the number of patrons contemplated in
the lease of a doctor's office was not large enough to constitute a public
use.' 3 In favor of such an attitude it has been argued that a further exten-
sion of the public use doctrine will swallow up the common-law rule of
landlord non-liability.' 4 It has also been urged that the doctrine should be
strictly limited since a rule which will compel landlords to repair or take
the consequences will increase the burden of rents on tenants.'- The
answer to these arguments is simple: unless there is some compelling reason
for retaining the common-law rule, there is no advantage in protecting it;
and the increased burden which will fall on the tenants will merely be in
lieu of the expenses which they are under a duty to make in repairing the
premises themselves. Furthermore, landlords, who ultimately benefit from
the public's use of the premises, will be prevented from insulating them-
selves from liability by leasing to irresponsible tenants where the premises
threaten members of the public with an unreasonable risk of injury. 6 The
controlling factor in determining whether the landlord should be liable
should be the probability of injury to any invitee, not the number of
invitees who may be endangered.' 7 If a plaintiff can show that the lessor
of a doctor's office should have realized, at the time the land was leased,
that there was an unreasonable likelihood of injury to one of his lessee's
patients because of a defect in the premises, the reasons for holding that
lessor liable are as strong as the reasons for imposing liability on the lessor
of a much larger public establishment.
7. Colorado Mortgage & Invest. Co. v. Giacomini, 55 Colo. 540, 136 Pac. IO39
(1913).
8. Warner v. Lucey, 207 App. Div. 241, 201 N. Y. Supp. 658 (3d Dep't 1923),
aff'd, 238 N. Y. 638, 144 N. E. 924 (924). Contra: Hayden v. Second National Bank,
331 Pa. 29, 199 AtI. 218 (1938).
9. Wilson v. Brown Co., 62 Ga. App. 898, 1O S. E. (2d) 219 (194o); Turner v.
Kent, 134 Kan. 574, 7 P. (2d) 513 (1932). Contra: Bender v. Weber, 250 Mo. 551, 157
S. W. 570 (1913); Davis v. Schmitt Bros., igg App. Div. 683, 192 N. Y. Supp. 15 (2d
Dep't 1922).
io. Webel v. Yale University, 125 Conn. 315, 7 A. (2d) 215 (1939).
ii. Hines v. Willcox, 96 Tenn. 328, 34 S. W. 42o (1896). Cotra: Bouy v.
Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 338 Pa. 5, 12 A. (2d) 7 (1940).
I2. Gilligan v. Blakesley, 93 Colo. 370, 26 P. (2d) 8o8 (1933). A complete dis-
cussion of all the public use cases may be found in Eldredge, mupra note i. See also
123 A. L. R. 870 (1939).
13. The public use doctrine has been applied only once in New Jersey. Martin v.
Asbury Park, iii N. J. L. 364, 168 At. 612 (1933) (bathing pavilion). It had been
approved previously in dicta.
14. "Obviously a public garage does not fall within the purview of the exception.
. . . Such an extension . . . would leave nothing of the general rule save the lease
of a private dwelling." Hayden v. Second National Bank, 331 Pa. 29, 32, 199 Atl. 218,
219 (1938).
15. Eldredge, .spra note I, at 490.
16. Junkermann v. Tilyou Realty Co., 213 N. Y. 404, 4o9, io8 N. E. 19o, 192
(1915); Swords v. Edgar, 59 N. Y. 28, 37 (874) ; Larson v. Calder's Park Co., 54
Utah 325, 334, i8o Pac. 599, 6o2 (igig). It should be noted that if the tenant is re-
sponsible, the ultimate loss will fall on him since the landlord will have an action against
him for breach of his duty to repair.
17. "The fact that the lease is for the specific purpose of throwing it (the land)
open to the public is, in some of the cases, held to make its condition, rendering it dan-
gerous to the public using it, 'a nuisance', so as to make the landlord liable. . . . It
is hard to see any logical distinction between such cases and the lease of a shop or even
a dwelling. The probability of injury, and not the number of persons imperilled should
control. See also Weber v. Yale University, 125 Conn. 315, 7 A. (2d) 215 (1938).
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Mortgages-Reduction of Deficiency Judgment by Fair Value of
Property Where Mortgagor Has Conveyed to Assuming Grantee-
The mortgagee has foreclosed and the assuming grantee, being impover-
ished, resists confirmation of the sale under a local equity rule whereby
confirmation is withheld, where the debtor is impoverished, until the mort-
gagee agrees to reduce his deficiency judgment by the fair value of the
land. The mortgagee consented to the set off against the assuming grantee
but contended that it should not be allowed as to the affluent mortgagor
who was not protected by the rule. Held (two justices dissenting), the
set off must be allowed to both parties. Fidelity Union Trust Co. v.
Matthews et at., 17 A. (2d) 154 (N. J. Ct. Errors and App. 194o).
Influenced by the nation-wide depression and the disappearance of
competitive bidding at foreclosure sales, the New Jersey equity courts,
along with other jurisdictions,1 altered their foreclosure rules,2 forcing the
mortgagee to reduce his deficiency judgment by the fair value of the mort-
gaged property. The New Jersey rule allowed this set off only to "dis-
tressed" debtors,' thus purporting to prevent affluent mortgagors from
unloading undesirable property on to their mortgagees for its "fair value". 4
This rule is especially commendable in that it is the first in the long history
of increasing protection for "distressed" mortgagors which has attempted
to discriminate only in favor of those mortgagors who were actually dis-
tressed. Since in the instant case the mortgagor was not distressed, the
mortgagee contended that he should not be allowed the benefit of the rule.5
The court, however, noting that if the mortgagor were forced to pay the
full judgment he could, either by virtue of his contract right with his
assuming grantee 6 or under the suretyship analogy,7 secure a similar
judgment against his grantee 8 and thus deprive him of the relief intended
for him,9 held that the set off should be allowed as to both parties. The
i. For an excellent discussion of the different forms of relief invoked for the aid
of mortgagors during the depression see Vaughan, Reform of Mortgage Foreclosure
Procedure-Possibilities suggested by Honeynman v. facobs (194o) 88 U. oF PA. L.
REV. 957.
2. Federal Title and Mortgage Guaranty Company v. Lowenstein et al., 113 N. J.
Eq. 2oo, 209, I66 Atl. 538, 542 (Ch. 1933). The court there said, "The principles of
equity will be applied to new cases as they are presented, and relief will not be with-
held merely on the ground that no precedent can be found. . . . Confirmation will
be withheld unless and until the complainant purchaser stipulates that the fair value
of the mortgaged premises, . . . will be credited on the decree and deficiency suit
prosecuted only for the balance thereof."
3. Young v. Weber, 117 N. J. Eq. 242, 244, 175 Atl. 273, 274 (Ch. 1934). The
court stated "To entitle a petitioner to relief under the doctrine of that case, he must
affirmatively show . . . (3) the existence of an emergency because of which the
defendant was unable to protect himself by refinancing or otherwise; and (4) his own
inability-lack of financial resources-to protect himself at the sale."
4. Maher v. Usbe Building and Loan Association et al., n16 N. J. Eq. 475, 477,
174 Atl. 159, i6o (Ch. 1934), where it is said, "The disappointed but affluent mortgagor
may not take advantage of a rule designed to relieve distress during an emergency to
avoid payment of his debt and unload his unprofitable land upon an unwilling mort-
gagee who is as much entitled to the protection of this court as is the mortgagor."
5. Instant case at 154.
6. "The mortgagor would then have an action at law on their covenant and so they
would be deprived of the protection which Young v. Weber . . . and similar cases
were designed to afford." Instant case at 155.
7. "The law is well settled that a purchaser of land who assumes and agrees to pay
the mortgage debt, becomes as between himself and vendor, the principal debtor and
the vendor becomes his security. . . !" Reinfeld v. Fidelity Union Trust Co., 123
N. J. Eq. 428, 433, 198 AtI. 220, 223 (Ch. 1938), aff'd, 125 N. J. Eq. 347, 5 A. (2d)
699 (1939).
8. Instant case at 155.
9. "But the grantees should not be deprived of their equitable right because a pos-
sible well-to-do mortgagor may incidentally benefit." Instant case at 155.
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mortgagee had contended that if the mortgagor were forced to pay the full
debt he would receive title to the land and that on exercising his right of
subrogation against the grantee, he could be required to credit the grantee
with its fair value.10 This contention cannot be supported since the mort-
gagor on paying the debt and securing subrogation need not exercise this
equitable right but may proceed against the assuming grantee for the full
debt on the basis of his contract of assumption.1' The court was thus
forced to render this decision which provides a convenient device by which
affluent mortgagors may defeat the purpose of the rule 12 simply by con-
veying to an impecunious straw man.13 This decision would seem to leave
the New Jersey courts with two alternatives: either to hold that no fore-
closure sale will be confirmed where the fair value of the land has not been
realized, whether the mortgagors be impoverished or not; 14 or to retain
the present rule and to require an affirmative showing of good faith, which
the court in the instant case appears to have presumed. In view of the
admirable purpose of the rule, i. e. to aid only those in actual distress, the
latter alternative would certainly appear to be more desirable.
Public Utilities-Public Service Commission's Regulation of
Non-Profit Electric Power Co-operative-A power company supply-
ing electrical power to rural members on a co-operative basis without profit,
and under franchise,' filed application with the Commission for exemption
from obtaining a Certificate. 2  Held, a non-profit electrical co-operative,
serving members only, is not subject to regulation as a public utility because
it does not serve "the public generally". 3 Garkane Power Co., Inc. v. Public
Service Commission, ioo P. (2d) 571 (Sup. Ct. Utah, 194o).
Statutes defining a public utility state two important characteristics:
service dedicated to the use of the public,4 and service for hire or compen-
sation.5 The concept of a co-operative as an association serving only mem-
Io. Instant case at 255.,
ii. See note 6 supra.
12. See note 4 supra.
x3. It appears that Mr. Vaughan did not anticipate the instant decision when he
wrote that "The last requirement, by reason of the fact that it considers the financial
status of the mortgagor in each case, appears more desirable than the necessarily more
general provisions of any statutory limitations of deficiency judgments, since it pre-
vents an affluent mortgagor from merely unloading such property he does not want
on a possibly indigent mortgagee." Vaughan, loc. cit. suPra note i at 975.
24. As in Pennsylvania where there is no requirement of a distressed debtor. "In
this Commonwealth, the principle is established that gross inadequacy of price, on timely
application by the mortgagor, furnishes sound basis for setting aside a sheriff's sale."
Peoples-Pittsburgh Trust Company v. Blickle et al., 330 Pa. 398, 399, igg Atl. 213, 214
(x938).
i. UTAH REv. STAT. ANN. (1933) tit. 18, c. 6.
2. On June 1, 1939 Garkane filed with the Public Service Commission an appli-
cation for exemption from obtaining a Certificate, and, in the alternative for a Cer-
tificate of Convenience and Necessity. On hearing the application was denied with the
Commission assuming jurisdiction. After rehearing denied, Garkane appealed on
a Writ of Certiorari direct to the supreme court.
3. UTAH R-v. STAT. ANN. (1933) tit. 76, c. 4, § i, vests in the Public Utilities
Commission "power to supervise and regulate every public utility in this state." "The
term 'public utility' includes every . . . electric corporation . . . where the serv-
ice is performed for, or the commodity delivered to, the public generally," UTAH REv.
STAT. ANN. (933) tit. 76, c. 2, § 1 (28) ; "An electrical corporation is a person or
persons which owns, controls, or manages an electric plant or in anywise furnishes elec-
tric power 'for public service' within the state." UTAH REV. STAT. ANN. (1933) tit.
76, C. 2, § 1 (20).
4. See note 3, supra.
S. Ma. REv. STAT. (293o) c. 62, § 15.
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bers on a non-profit basis exempts it from the usual statutory description
of a public utility 6 according to the weight of authority.7 Like other indus-
tries, however, co-operatives tend to expand.8 Territories enlarge, mem-
bership grows,' and competition with other concerns results. 0 Frequently
the co-operative makes contracts with private concerns, and often with non-
members." But it still demands its freedom from regulation, with the right
to charge what rates it deems advisable. Existing utilities, on the other
hand, demand equality. The problem raised by such claims, as exemplified
by the instant case, is one of degree. The result should hinge not on narrow
constructions of statutory definitions, but on an application to each case of
the policy supporting regulation of important businesses in which the public
has a direct interest. Relevant factors will be the size of the organization, 2
and the extent of its contact with non-members 1 or the general public.' 4
The absence of the two factors last mentioned supports the result in the
instant case.
Taxation-Lobbying Costs Not Deductible from Taxable In-
come-Taxpayer made contingent fee contracts with foreign interests
to lobby for favorable legislation.' He wished to deduct fees paid under
this contract in computing taxable income. Reversing the Board of Tax
Appeals, the court held 2 that fees were not deductible because lobbying and
contracts promoting it are against public policy, Commissioner of Ihternal
Revenue v. Textile Mills Securities Corp., 117 F. (2d) 62 (1940).
6. People ex rel. Knowlton v. Orange County Farmers and Merchants Ass'n.,
56 Cal. App. 205, 204 Pac. 873 (1922); State Public Utilities Commission ex rel.
Macon County Tel. Co. v. Bethany Mut. Tel. Ass'n., 270 Ill. 183, Iio N. E. 334
(1915).
7. Inland Empire Rural Electrification, Inc. v. Department of Public Service
of Washington, ig9 Wash. 527, 92 P. (2d) 258 (1939) ; Schumacher v. R. R. Com-
mission, 185 Wis. 303, 201 N. W. 241 (1924) ; Overlook Development Co. v. Public
Service Commission, 3o6 Pa. 43, 158 At. 869 (1932). See also other cases cited in
note 6 supra.
8. In 1936 Congress created the Rural Electrification Administration, a United
States Agency, under the Rural Electrification Act (May 20, 1936) 49 STAT. 1363,
7 U. S. C. A., §§ 9Ol-914, which authorizes the agency to make loans in the several
states and territories for rural electrification and the furnishing of electrical energy
to persons in rural areas, who are not receiving control station service. The act is
responsible in large measure for the extraordinary rise of co-operative enterprise in
the field of power transmission.
9. This is not a controlling factor in any one case. See Garkane Power Co.,
Inc. v. Public Service Commission, Ioo P. (2d) 571, 574 (Sup. Ct. Utah, 394o).
See also Cawker v. Meyer, 147 Wis. 320, 325, 133 N. W. 157, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.)
510.
io. See Perry County Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 265 Pa.
274, 279, lo8 Atl. 659, 66o (1gig).
ii. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Project Mut. Tel. & Tel. Co., P. U. R.
I9i6F 370 (Idaho, x916); State Public Utilities Comm. ex rel. Pike City Tel. Co.
v. Noble, 275 Ill. 86, 113 N. E. 91o (1916); State ex reL. Buffum Tel. Co. v. Public
Service Commission, 222 Mo. 627, 399 S. W. 962 (1917).
12. in re Harrison Rural Electrification, 24 P. U. R. (N. S.) 7 (W. Va. 1939).
13. Ashley Tri-City Mut. Tel. Co. v. New Ashley Tel. Co., 92 Ohio St. 336, i1O
N. E. 959 (1915).
14. Gilman v. Sommerset Farmer Co-operative Tel. Co., 129 Me. 243, 151 AtI.
440 (1930).
i. Taxpayer sought legislation which would enable him to receive restitution for
property seized under the Trading with the Enemy Act, 40 STAT. 411 (1917), 50 U. S.
C. A. app. (1928). Favorable legislation was passed in 1928. Settlement of War
Claims Act, 45 STAT. 254.
2. Judges Goodrich and Mars dissented.
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It is generally said that lobbying costs may not be deducted as "ordi-
nary and necessary expenses" 3 in computing taxable income ' because lobby-
ing violates public policy.5 However, advertising and publicity campaign
expenses to create public opinion favorable to railroad legislation is deduct-
ible,' as are costs of contesting the validity of existing legislation. 7 The
same principles which govern attempts to invalidate present laws should
apply to the promotion of proposed laws. The decided cases are not as hos-
tile to this result as the general rule would indicate, since most involve situa-
tions where misrepresentation, forceful pressure, or bribery were used ' or
intended. 9 Furthermore, where the reward is contingent upon success
courts frequently 10 refuse deduction on the ground that such contracts en-
courage corrupt methods."' In the instant case the court stressed Section
23 (q) of the Revenue Act, which provides that expenditures for lobbying
are not deductible.12 Although the Section is primarily concerned with
donations to lobbying organizations, the court interprets it to include costs
of direct lobbying as well. The result is in accord with the holding in Sun-
set Scavenger Co. v. Commissioner," which decided that no lobbying ex-
penses could be "ordinary and necessary" regardless of how the activity was
carried on. Although the Board had previously followed that case, 14 in
the instant case it distinguished those previous decisions as relying on ab-
sence of causal connection between the lobbying and the passage of the bill
or on the presence of illegality, 5 finding neither objection in the present
case. The court returned to the position that lobbying is not the proxi-
3. This is supported by the general refusal to allow such expenses to be used in
computation of rates by public utilities. San Diego Water Co. v. San Diego, II8 Cal.
556, 50 Pac. 633 (1897).
4. Old Mission Portland Cement Co. v. Comm'r, 69 F. (2d) 676 (C. C. A. 9th,
1934) ; 3 PAur & MzRums, LAw oF Fmum INcOME TAxATION (1934) § 23.47 and
n. 92.
5. Query as to whether lobbying is against public policy. Many public spirited
citizens are in favor of it. Only the bribery side of lobbying is really bad. However,
the fundamental assumption throughout the opinion in the case at bar is that lobbying
is against public policy, and the opinion must be considered on that basis.
6. Ulster & Del. R. P-, 25 B. T. A. io9 (1932); Los Angeles & Salt Lake . R.,
18 B. T. A. 168 (1929).
7. George Reagler & Co., io B. T. A. 1134 (1928). See Note (I935) 45 YALE
L. J. 731, to the effect that the dogma should not be rigidly applied.
8. See Note (1930) 78 U. oF PA. L. Rav. 4oi, 4o4.
9. See Note (934) 14 B. U. L. Rv. 834.
io. Trist v. Child, 21 Wall. 44i (U. S. 1874); Noonan v. Gilbert, 68 F. (2d) 775
(App. D. C. I934). But see Winton v. Amos, 255 U. S. 375 (920).
ii. This leaves only professional services in properly drafting, petitioning, or pub-
licly submitting the facts to the proper authorities as legitimate and expenses pursuant
thereto as deductible. Steele v. Drnirond, 275 U. S. 199 (927). Even this is con-
fined to individual debt or contract claim requiring legislation to provide a remedy. See
Gesellschaft ffir Drahtlose Telegraphie M. B. H. v. Brown, 78 F. (2d) 410 (App. D.
C. 1935), where a contract similar to the instant one was held void as against public
policy. Query: Is there any difference between a contract which is illegal and one
which is against public policy?
In the Gesellschaft case the court distinguished between lobbying for debt legisla-
tion and lobbying for remedial legislation. Contracts for the former are all right;
for the latter, against public policy. Debt legislation is that which provides the means
for rec6vering a debt already owed; remedial legislation creates the debt. The dis-
senting judges claim that the instant legislation, although classified as remedial was
really debt. It is doubtful whether anything can be solved by placing it in such a
tenuous category.
12. See (193o) 30 CoL. L. REv. 121r.
13. 84 F. (2d) 453 (C. C. A. 9th, z936).
x4. L. S. Kirby, 35 B. T. A. 578 (r937); W. P. Kyne, 35 B. T. A. 2o2 (z936).
IS. Textile Mills Securities Corp., 38 B. T. A. 623 (1938).
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mate cause of the passage of the legislation,16 and approved the result of the
Sunset case. Taking a more realistic view, the dissenting judges drew an
analogy to mercantile advertising. A merchant will not be "disallowed his
trade advertising expenses because he cannot show that these expenses
brought in customers or because he cannot show that the customers who
did arrive came in under the hypnotic influence of his advertising"." Ac-
tually, since this is a revenue statute and not a penal one, legality of the
activity should not control at all.18 Income from all sources is taxable;
expenses necessary to the earning of that income should be deductible.2 0
Torts-Duties of Landholders to Warn of Dangerous Conditions
-Fire started in basement of defendant's building into which gasoline had
seeped from adjoining premises. Defendant's janitor, who was burned by
first explosion but was at hand when firemen arrived, neglected to warn
them of the danger. In an action by firemen for injuries suffered in subse-
quent explosion, held, defendant liable. Jenkins v. 313-321 W. 3 7 th Street
Corp., 31 N. E. (2d) 503 (N. Y. i94o).
Fire at defendant's gasoline storage plant neared open manhole of
fume-filled tank. At arrival of firemen and engine on the premises, defend-
ant's employees fled without warning of the danger, of which they were
aware. Explosion injured firemen and wrecked the engine. Defendant
held liable to firemen for personal injuries and to city for damage to engine.
James v. Cities Service Oil Co., 31 N. E. (2d) 872 (Ohio App. 1939) ;
City of Youngstown v. Cities Service Oil Co., 31 N. E. (2d) 876 (Ohio
App. 1940).
The majority of American courts,' erroneously likening those entering
land under a public privilege not connected with the possessor's business 2
to bare licensees,8 have held that the landholder owes both merely the duty
to refrain from "wanton and wilful misconduct".4 No case, however, has
been found in which a fireman recovered under this standard of care. If it
had been applied to the instant cases, there would have been no recovery.5
Although there are courts which have not applied such a strict test when
16. Of course actual corruption of the members of the legislature might have a
close causal connection. This, however, would not be allowable since the payment of
the bribe would be a crime.
17. Instant case at 78.
IS. See Judge Maris' dissent in the instant case at 77.
ig. United States v. Sullivan, 274 U. S. 259 (1926).
20. Steinberg v. United States, 14 F. (2d) 564 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926) (where bribes
given for protection were deductible). There was no evidence that the specific activi-
ties in the instant case were of a questionable nature or, in themselves, against any pub-
lic policy.
I. For a collection of cases, see Note (1921) 13 A. L. R. 637, brought up to date
in A. L. R. BLUEBOOK OF SuOPLEmENTAL DEcisioNs (1939 ed.) at 115.
2. In Low v. G. T. Ry., 72 Me. 313 (1881), a customs officer who was injured
while prowling about a dock in search of smugglers was held to be a business invitee.
3. "But it seems odd that once having so held (that firemen were not invitees), the
courts should have regarded the officer as a mere licensee, for a license is as much a
creature of consent as an invitation. . . ." Bohlen, The Duty of a Landouner To-
ward Those Entering His Premises of Their Ow; Right (1921) 69 U. OF PA. L. REv.
147, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS (1926) 162.
4. Aldworth v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 295 Mass. 344, 3 N. E. (2d) IOO8 (1936);
Todd v. Armour & Co., 44 Ga. App. 6o9, 162 S. E. 394 (1934). But cf. Buckeye Cot-
ton Oil Co. v. Compagna, 146 Tenn. 389, 343 S. W. 646 (1922) ; Meiers v. Fred Koch
Brewery, 229 N. Y. io, 127 N. E. 491 (1920).
s. The phrase "wanton and wilful misconduct" has been used to describe careless
activities which injured a known trespasser. Cf. Eldredge, Tort Liability to Trespas-
sers (937) 12 TEp. L. Q. 33, 48. Apparently, however, it has not been invoked to
impose liability for failure to warn him of a dangerous artificial condition.
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RECENT CASES
the landholder had summoned the firemen,6 violated a safety statute,7 main-
tained a nuisance," or neglected a duty to business guests the observance of
which would have prevented the injury,9 none of these prior decisions
were authority for the instant cases.10  However, textwriters I' have advo-
cated requiring the landholder to anticipate the privileged entry and employ
reasonable care to warn of or make safe known dangerous conditions. This
position, which was taken by the American Law Institute in the Restate-
ment of Torts,12 went beyond Meiers v. Fred Koch Brewery,18 the then
leading case, which held the landholder liable only for injuries to privileged
entrants because of neglected approaches. The instant cases thus are
largely an adoption of the Restatement view. The Ohio court, however,
in extending protection to the city's property, may go beyond the Restate-
ment."4 The results reached, it is true, further encroach on the tottering
though persistent concept of sovereignty of the possessor of land within
his own boundaries. Nevertheless, as this anachronism has yielded in
favor of greater protection to licensees, 5 it was to be expected that the
same would be true of entrants under public privilege. While there is not
such certainty of entry by firemen as exists in the case of licensees, the
interest protected, that of personal integrity, is similarly of the highest
dignity, and those who are protected further provide important public and
private benefits. Although the fire equipment case is more advanced, there
is no validity in distinguishing interests of personality from those of prop-
erty for this purpose, and defendant should bear all the loss of which his
negligence was a sine qua non.
Trusts-Resulting Trust Pro Tanto for Part Payment of Pur-
chase Price of Land-Husband before marriage bought land in his
own name for $I4,5oo, of which $5,ooo was contributed by him and the
remainder by fiancee with the intention that the land be held for the benefit
of both in undefined proportions. In a suit by fiancee (now wife) to
establish title, and for an accounting, it was held, that her contributions
were general 1 and not for a specific share and there was no resulting trust.
Druker v. Druker, 31 N. E. (2d) 524 (Mass. 1941).
Where a transfer of property is made to one person and the purchase
price is paid by another, it is well settled that, without more, the beneficial
6. Buckeye Cotton Oil Co. v. Compagna, 146 Tenn. 389, 242 S. W. 646 (1922).
7. Drake v. Fenton, 237 Pa. 8, 85 Atl. 14 (1912). Contra: Litch v. White, I6o
Cal. 497, 117 Pac. 575 (1911) ; Gibson v. Leonard, 143 Ill. 182, 32 N. E. 182 (1892).
8. Cameron v. Kenyon-Connell Commercial Co., 22 Mont. 312, 56 Pac. 358 (1899).
9. Meiers v. Fred Koch Brewery, 229 N. Y. 10, 127 N. E. 491 (1920).
Io. The results reached in Houston Belt, etc., R. R. v. O'Leary, 136 S. W. 6oi
(Tex. Civ. App. 191i) may go as far as the instant personal injury cases, but it is based
on a somewhat dubious theory of negligence.
ii. HARPER, TORTS (1938) § 96; PoLLocK, TORTS (1939) 411.
12. § 345.
13. 229 N. Y. 1o, 127 N. E. 491 (192o).
14. It is not clear whether § 497, which declares that the same rules of negligence
as are applied to the person are to be applied to property, was meant to broaden the
duties of landholders to include property of privileged entrants.
15. Rushton v. Winters, 331 Pa. 78, 8o, 2oo Atl. 6o, 61 (1938) ; Recreation Centre
Corp. v. Zimmerman, 192 Md. 309, 312, 191 Atl. 233, 234 (1927), with which compare
Bohlen, loc. cit. supra note 3 at 143, n. 2, op. cit. upra note 3 at 157, n. 2.
i. A general contribution usually refers to the situation where a person keeps no
accurate record, but makes payments from time to time to the fund from which the
land is purchased. Almost always such contributions are considered gifts and there is
no resulting trust. Such was not the situation here; so it is difficult to understand why
the contribution in the instant case was termed general. See RESTATEMENT, TRUSTs
(1935) § 454, comment c; 3 ScoTT ON TRUSTS (I939) § 454; 2 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES (1935) § 457.
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interest in the land inures to the payer of the purchase price.2  Likewise
a resulting trust pro tanto may arise when part of the purchase price is
paid by one person and the title is taken by another.3 The rule giving rise
to a resulting trust is based on presumption and may be rebutted by evi-
dence indicating a loan or a gift. Thus where the relationship between
the parties is close, that in itself is often deemed to be sufficient to shift the
presumption from a trust to that of a gift.4 The instant court did not base
its decision on this, but applied a more artificial standard. Where only a
part of the purchase price has been paid, courts have developed two rules
to restrict the presumption of a resulting trust, feeling that in this situation
there is no strong evidence of intent that the beneficial interest be in the
payer. One line of authority requires that a specific part of the purchase
price be paid by the one claiming the resulting trust. 5 The stricter view,
adopted by the Massachusetts court in the instant case, is that not only
must a specific part of the price be paid, but that there must also be an
understanding that the payment was for a proportional interest in the land.6
The first requirement, common to both rules, is proper since indefinite,
unrecorded contributions point more to a gift than a trust. The payment
in the instant case, although termed a "general" contribution by the court,
was not of this type.7 That the contribution be for a definite part or interest
in the land seems a less reasonable requirement, since the effect is to require
that an agreement be shown, and the very purpose of the rule is to provide
a remedy where the intention does not appear." The harshness of the latter
requirement is reflected in the instant case where the plaintiff paid nearly
two-thirds of the purchase price and was found by the court to have in-
tended to derive some benefit. But since she could show no agreement for
a specific interest, she got none, and forfeited the purchase money as well.
A rule giving her an interest to the extent of her contribution would be
more equitable.
2. Howe v. Howe, 199 Mass. 598, 85 N. E. 945 (i9o8) ; Wilson v. Williams, 215
N. C. 407, 2 S. E. (2d) ig (i939); Quinn v. Gormley, 302 Pa. 36o, 153 At. 623
(1931) ; RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 440. In a number of states where the pur-
chase money resulting trust has been abolished by statute, the courts resort to con-
structive trusts. See Note (i93o) 28 MIcH. L. REv. 918.
3. RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (I935) §454.
4. Ibid. comment a; 3 Scorr oN TRUSTS (939) §454.
Where the parties are man and wife, the result is somewhat odd since it is held
that where the husband pays the purchase price the presumption is one of a gift, but
when the wife pays, the majority indicate that there is no such presumption. For a case
so holding, see Bingham v. National Bank of Montana, IO5 Mont. i59, 72 P. (2d) go
(I937), noted in (938) 23 CoRN. L. Q. 476.
5. Chase v. Andrus, 192 Ark. 418, 9I S. W. (2d) 1035 (1936) ; Fox v. Shanley, 94
Conn. 350, IO9 Atl. 249 (r920).
As the rule was once phrased, the contribution had to be an aliquot part of the
whole. If the strict dictionary meaning were followed it would mean that the pay-
ment had to be a fractional portion of which the numerator was unity, e. g., one-quarter,
one-third, etc. Although the label still attaches to the rule, it is used to contrast a
definite contribution from a general contribution. Skehill v. Abbot, 184 Mass. 145, 68
N. E. 37 (903).
6. Moat v. Moat, 301 Mass. 469, I7 N. E. (2d) 710 (1938); Wright v. Wright,
134 Tex. 82, 132 S. W. (2d) 847 (I939).
7. See note i supra. .
8. 2 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935) § 457.
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